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The problem of job security has been addressed by the industrial-
ized countries in the West and Japan with increased frequency in the
post World War II period. Promulgated in 1982, the International La-
bor Organization's Termination of Employment Convention,1 which
provides some measure of job security for dismissed employees, high-
* Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law at Stanford Law School; Co-Chairman of
the California State Bar Ad Hoc Committee on Wrongful Discharge and Termi-
nation At Will.
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Thomas Thompson, Stanford Law School '89.
1. Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, International La-
bour Conference, 68th Session, Reports V(1) & (2) (1982).
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lights the significance of the issue. And, the matter of individual dis-
missals of workers, in particular, principally for disciplinary reasons
- long ago addressed by comprehensive unfair dismissal legislation in
other industrialized countries - has become both a centerpiece of in-
dustrial relations legal conflict in the 1980's in America and a problem
that will not disappear in the coming decades.
Protection of jobs is also important to what Europeans refer to as
collective dismissal and regulate through job protection legislation -
the layoff of large numbers of employees for economic reasons. A
growing number of states in this country have enacted plant closure
legislation which requires notification of closing, information to be
provided to employees, or the award of severance benefits to assist in
relocation. President Reagan vetoed the same kinds of legislation at
the national2 level when it was part of an omnibus trade bill and Con-
gress considered the matter anew.3 The second time around, subse-
quent to passage of identical legislation by both Houses of Congress, 4
Mr. Reagan declined to veto a plant closing notification measure
standing alone,5 allowing the bill to become law without his signature
because political sentiment in Congress and public opinion promised
to make a veto politically beneficial for the Democratic Presidential
nominee Michael Dukakis.6 Moreover, a series of collective bargain-
ing agreements fashioned by the United Auto Workers in the farm
equipment and automobile industries in 1987 have provided workers
with relatively comprehensive protection against collective
dismissals.7
The new focus upon employment and the view that improper dis-
missals require regulation is appropriate. The Supreme Court has
2. Senate Upholds Veto; New Trade Bill Sought, N.Y. Times, June 9,1988, at D1, col.
4.
3. A Plant-Closings Bill Worth Passing, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1988, at A22, col. 1;
Congress Drafts Revised Trade Bill, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1988, at D1, col. 3;
G.O.P. Plan On Layoffs Is Defeated, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1988, at 33, col. 3;
Republicans in Senate Fail To Block Plant-Closing Bill, N.Y. Times, June 28,
1988, at C1, col. 1.
4. 134 CONG. REc. H5500, 5520 (daily ed. July 13, 1988); House Passes Bill on Plant
Closings by Vote of 286-136, N.Y. Times, July 14,1988, at Al, col. 1; 72 to 23 Senate
Vote Approves Notice of Plant Closings, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
5. Roberts, President Decides Not to Veto Bill Requiring Notice of Plant Closings,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1988, at Al, col 2.
6. Hume, Reagan, Succumbing to Politics, Decides Against Vetoing Plant Closings
Measure, Wall St. J., Aug 3, 1988, at 3, col. 2.
7. Caterpillar, UAW are Said to Agree Tentatively on Pact with Wage Freeze, Wall
St. J., July 7, 1986, at 7, col. 2; Ford and UAWAgree on 3 Year Pact That Grants
Broad Job Guarantees Except During Industry Slump, Wall St. J., Sept. 18,1987,
at 3, col. 1; GMLooksfor UAW Contract Loopholes, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1987, at 5,
col. 2. However, the 1987 agreements do not establish new protection for workers
in plants which are not closed but rather "idled" for a substantial period of time,
i.e. years as well as months.
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now recognized a property interest of the employee in the job he or
she has held and the status derived from employee expectations.8 I
reiterate what I said about this matter two years ago:
It seems to me that the starting point for evaluation of these issues is the
realization that in a modem industrialized economy employment is central to
one's existence and dignity. One's job provides not only income essential to
the acquisition of the necessities of life, but also the opportunity to shape the
aspirations of one's family, aspirations which are both moral and educational.
Along with marital relations and religion, it is hard to think of what might be
viewed as more vital in our society than the opportunity to work and retain
one's employment status.9
I. DISCIPLINARY DISMISSALS: THE PROBLEM
The 1980's have witnessed a host of individual employer-employee
controversies which have arisen both in and out of the organized labor
sector of the economy. The rights of retirees, questions of privacy aris-
ing out of drug testing and alcohol abuse programs, 10 and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act11 claims have woven their way into
the tort and contract theories now associated with wrongful discharge
8. Skeptics should note that this principle was established by Justice Powell's opin-
ion in the context of reverse discrimination litigation attacking the propriety of
affirmative action in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). See
generally W. Gould, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DIscRMINATION IN
THE UNITED STATES (1977).
9. Gould, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America The Legal and
Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 885, 892; see also Culpep-
per v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970); Woolley v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 300, 491 A.2d 1257, 1266 (1985), modified, 101 N.J. 10,
499 A.2d 515 (1985).
10. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986) (holding that selection by lot for drug testing does not violate jockey's
fourth amendment rights); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (re-
versing lower court's decision prohibiting public school system's compulsory drug
testing program without probable cause); National Treasury Employees Union v.
Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that urinalysis for employees seeking
promotion is reasonable search); Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Bur-
lington N.R.R., 838 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that railroad's unilateral
implementation of mandatory drug testing program is a "major dispute" within
the meaning of the Railway Labor Act); see generally Comment, Yellow Rows of
Test Tubes: Due Process Constraints on Discharge of Public Employees Based on
Drug Urinalysis Testing, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1623 (1987); Bible, Employee Urine
Testing and the Fourth Amendment, 38 LAB. L.J. 611 (1987); and Joseph, Fourth
Amendment Implications of Public Sector Workplace Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L.
REv. 605 (1987).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); see also Western Air Lines v. Cris-
well, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (affirming lower court's decision that Airline violated
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by requiring mandatory retire-
ment of flight engineers without showing age restriction is reasonably necessary
to overriding interest in public safety); Transworld Air Lines v. Thurston, 469




actions initiated throughout the country. While the wrongful dis-
charge litigation appears to have given some protection to workers al-
ready covered by the grievance/arbitration machinery of the
organized labor sector,' 2 its principal impact to date has been upon
the swelling non-union sector of employment.
A substantial majority of the workforce today is not protected by
the provisions of collective bargaining agreements or the civil service
regulations which provide comparable protection to public sector em-
ployees.13 Litigation in both federal and state courts, principally in-
volving the application of state common law,14 is indicative of the
growing aggressiveness and contentiousness displayed by a majority of
private sector employees who enjoy none of the protections obtained
by unions in both the private and public sectors.
Professor Jack Stieber of Mfichigan State University estimates that
each year private sector employers terminate about three million em-
ployees for non-economic reasons. 15 If the total workforce is approxi-
mately 100,000,000 persons, the total number of at-will employees is
approximately 60,000,000 after subtracting the approximately
20,000,000 unionized employees and the approximately 20,000,000 civil
service employees. The 3,000,000 at-will employees discharged annu-
ally statistic, according to Professor Stieber's estimate, is based upon
calculations relating to the last available labor turnover rate of 4.6%
12. See Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988); Allis-
Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). While Lueck holds that tort theories may
be preempted by federal labor law's promotion of voluntarily negotiated griev-
ance/arbitration machinery, Lingle preserves state court jurisdiction in cases in-
volving the public policy exception to the principle that the contract of
employment is terminable at will notwithstanding the availability of arbitration
procedures in a collective bargaining agreement.
13. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(holding that a teacher cannot be terminated because of constitutionally pro-
tected activity unless she would have been terminated in the absence of protected
constitutional activity); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886 (1961) (holding that in absence of legislation, federal employment may
be terminated at will of appointing officer). Since 1979, a federal employee may
appeal disciplinary or performance discharges to the Merit System Protection
Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
14. See generally Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbi-
tration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 404 (1987) [hereinafter A Case for Arbitration];
Gould, supra note 9; Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis.
charge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980);
Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983); Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial
Limitations on the Right to Discharge: A California Trilogy, 16 U.C. DAvIs L.
REv. 65 (1982); Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissak Enforcing a Statutory Guar-
antee, 16 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 207 (1983); Gould, Protection From Wrongful Dis-
missal, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1984, at A21, col. 3.
15. J. Stieber, Address at Michigan State University on Employment-At-Wil" An
Issue for the 1980's, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at D-1 (Jan. 5, 1984).
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published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in Washington,
D.C.16
II. ECONOMIC OR COLLECTIVE DISMISSALS:
THE PROBLEM
The problems spawned by economic dismissals, particularly during
the recession of 1981 - 1983 are considerable. A recent BLS study
which included persons twenty years of age and over who had at least
three years of tenure, indicated that a total of 2,809,000 workers were
displaced because of plant closings or relocations between January
1981 and January 1983. Between January 1981 and January 1986, a
total of 10.8 million workers twenty years of age and over lost their
jobs because of plant closings or employment cutbacks. Of those
workers laid off, about 5.1 million had been at their jobs at least three
years.17 More than one out of three older workers (fifty-five years of
age or over) left the labor force after losing their jobs. The percentage
of blacks and Hispanics who were re-employed as of January 1986 was
ten percent lower than the comparable level of re-employment for
whites.18 Compounding the problems of these displaced employees is
the fact that only one-third of them received advance general notice
and only about one-half received specific notice of the layoff.19 Blue
collar workers in non-union establishments receive an average of only
2 days notice of plant closure or layoff.20
These layoffs have generated responses at the legislative, judicial,
and collective bargaining levels. First, as noted, the proliferation of
wrongful discharge actions, which frequently arise out of dislocations
attributable to mergers and other business re-arrangements, often in-
volve the question of selection of employees to be dismissed. The alle-
gation in such cases is that the employee-plaintiff has been selected for
dismissal arbitrarily or discriminatorily.
The second response to these many displaced workers is through
the collective bargaining process. Collective bargaining agreements
negotiated by labor unions and employers have regularly covered the
question of who is to be dismissed when economic circumstances or
16. Current Labor Statistics, 77 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 74, 86, table B-1 (1954).
17. Horvath, The Pulse of Economic Change: Displaced Workers of 1981-85, 110
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (June 1987).
18. Id.
19. See Brown, How Often Do Workers Receive Advance Notice of Layoffs?, 110
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 13 (June 1987).
20. TECHNOLOGY AND EMPLOYMENT: INNOVATION AND GROwTH IN THE UNITED
STATES ECONOMY 159 (Cyert & Mowery eds. 1987). However, another study pro-
vides different data. See Berenblein, Company Programs to Ease the Impact of
Shutdowns, Report No. 878 (The Conference Board, New York, 1986). See gener-
ally, Addison & Portugal, The Effect of Advance Notification of Plant Closings on
Unemployment, 41 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 3 (1987).
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lack of demand for products and profitability necessitate such action.
In America, the traditional collective bargaining response has been
the "last hired - first fired" approach which requires that employees
who are junior to others on the basis of working time accumulated in
the company, plant, department, or job must make way first for more
senior employees.
Another well accepted process is to provide so called "supplemen-
tal unemployment compensation" benefits for a displaced worker
which, combined with unemployment compensation insurance avail-
able from the state will provide a worker with 90-95% of his regular
wage. Such contracts have been negotiated for more than thirty years
by a number of unions - particularly the industrial unions like the
United Automobile Workers, the United Steelworkers, the United
Rubber Workers, and the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union.
These provisions have been expanded in some situations.21
In the 1980's the United Auto Workers (UAW) have negotiated
"job banks" with the major automobile companies designed to place
workers who are displaced because of technological innovation. In
1987, a series of collective bargaining agreements between the UAW
and farm equipment manufacturers and automobile companies ex-
tended "job bank" provisions to layoffs attributable to reductions in
volume without regard to the presence or absence of technological
innovation.22
Aside from addressing the question of employees to be dismissed
through the "last hired - first fired" mechanism, collective bargaining
agreements have provided for a variety of mechanisms designed to
provide workers with job security. An increasing number of collective
bargaining agreements provide for advance notice before layoff - 44%
of the agreements in a 1980 BLS study provided for such.23 This com-
pares with 43.6% in 1978, 42.1% in 1976, 42.5% in 1975 and 41.8% in
1974.24 Advance notice provisions are provided more often in con-
tracts negotiated in manufacturing industries rather than non-manu-
facturing industries. Advance notice is also provided, although less
frequently, before plant shutdowns or relocations. Of the agreements
reviewed by BLS in 1980, 9.8% had such clauses; this represented a
slight decline from comparable statistics in 1978.25 According to a re-
21. See Basic Patterns in Union Contracts (BNA) 53:2 (1961), 53:3 (1971), 44 (1975), 37
(1979), 38 (1983), & 45 (1986).
22. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 243, at A-5 (Dec. 13, 1986).
23. Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, Bureau of Lab. Sta-
tistics, Bull. 2095 at 107 (1981).
24. Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, Bureau of Lab. Sta-
tistics, Bull. 2065 at 100 (1980); Bull. 2013 at 78 (1979); Bull. 1957 at 89 (1977); Bull.
1888 at 73 (1975).
25. Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, Bureau of Lab. Sta-
tistics, Bull. 2095 at 107 (1981); Bull. 2065 at 100 (1980).
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cent General Accounting Office study, that figure has now grown to
23%.26 The United Rubber Workers was one of the first unions to ne-
gotiate the right to advance notification and now have provisions in
most of their agreements providing for a six month notification for
plant closings or layoffs that affect a specified percentage of the work
force.27 But another study demonstrates that blue collar workers in
unionized establishments receive an average of two weeks notice.28
Similarly, contract clauses providing for advance notice of techno-
logical change have appeared in 10.6% of the agreements included in
the 1980 study. Again, there was a slight drop from 1978.29 This con-
trasts rather sharply with the prevalence of contract clauses regulat-
ing subcontracting. A substantial percentage (58.1%) of agreements in
the 1980 study had such provisions; this represented an upward swing
from the 1970's.30 Undoubtedly, the more immediate realization of job
losses in the subcontracting situation accounts for greater use of such
provisions.
A 1986 Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) study found that succes-
sorship clauses which impose some burden of assuming the bargaining
relationship or contract clauses in mergers or business reorganiza-
tions appeared in 38% of the agreements.3 1 This represented a sub-
stantial increase from 22% in 1975.32 Accordingly, advance notice
before a layoff as well as subcontracting and successorship clauses ap-
pear to be the most prevalent vehicles to protect employee job
security.
Collective bargaining agreements traditionally have not imposed
substantive limitations upon layoffs as opposed to disciplinary dis-
charges where "just cause" contractual provisions place the burden of
proof upon an employer that seeks to rid itself of a worker. But in the
most regulated industries, such as railroads, trucking, airlines, and ur-
ban mass transportation, employees have received a considerable
amount of protection where mergers, acquisitions, and closings are in-
volved. The Washington Job Protection Agreement accomplished this
objective through the collective bargaining process for workers in the
26. Rasky, Battle Over Plant Closings, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1987, at D1, col. 3.
27. Id. at 28.
28. See supra note 19.
29. Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, Bureau of Lab. Sta-
tistics. Bull. 2095 at 107 (1981); Bull. 2065 at 100 (1980).
30. Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, Bureau of Lab. Sta-
tistics, Bull. 2095 at 104 (1981); Bull. 2065 at 97 (1980); Bull. 2013 at 75 (1979); Bull.
1957 at 86 (1977); Bull. 1888 at 70 (1975).
31. BNA, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, (BNA) 6 (11th ed. 6th printing
1986).




The Agreement provided for payment of 60% of a displaced
worker's pay for up to five years depending upon length of service,
displacement allowances for five years for employees retained at
lower pay, moving allowances, and severance pay based on length of
service. Eventually, the agreements incorporating the Washington
Job Protection Agreement were made enforceable under the Railway
Labor Act. The Agreement was expanded by the Rail Passenger Ser-
vice Act of 1970, which was, in part, designed to protect the interests of
employees displaced by inter-city rail passenger service.
As noted above, some of this approach has now begun to emerge in
the manufacturing industry, particularly with the UAW agreements
with farm equipment and automobile manufacturers. But there are
serious limitations surrounding these developments. The first limita-
tion is that employees represented by unions and covered by collective
agreements constitute only 16% or 17% of the work force - a figure
which compares unfavorably with all other industrialized countries.
Collective bargaining and its protection, thus, has no immediate signif-
icance for most American workers.
The second difficulty is that the law has played a somewhat limited
role in filling the gaps of voluntarily negotiated agreements between
labor and management in the collective dismissal arena, even in those
minority of instances in which unions represent workers. Federal la-
bor law has thus been of peripheral significance.
Illustrative of this trend is First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB,34 a seven to two Supreme Court decision that an employer is
not obliged to bargain about its decision to shut down operations de-
spite the obvious job losses that can result. The employer is obliged to
bargain about the effects of his decision, that is, retraining, relocation,
and severance pay. Of course, if the decision has already been made or
implemented some of the union's strength is eroded, a factor which
Justice Blackmun noted in his majority opinion in First National
Maintenance itself!
In the sixties and seventies, the Court gave short shrift to em-
ployee interests and job protection triggered by mergers, acquisitions,
and the like where the union sought to impose both contractual and
statutory duties and obligations upon successor employers.3 5 But in
33. See generally Aaron, Plant Closing: American and Comparative Perspectives, 59
Cm.[-]KENT L. REv. 941, 942-44 (1983).
34. 452 U.S. 666 (1981). See generally Gould, supra note 9, at 890-91, 915; Gould, The
Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Docket in the 1980 Term: Justice Bren-
nan's Term, 53 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 6-18 (1981); Harper, Leveling the Road from
Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargain-
ing, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982); Scokell, The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining: A
Critique and a Proposal, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 19 (1986).
35. In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964), the Court,
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Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB,36 the Court noted that
where employees were doing "essentially" the same work, under the
same working conditions, and with "basically" "the same body of cus-
tomers" the Board properly must take note of the fact that the em-
ployees will view their job situations as "essentially unaltered." Said
Justice Blackmun for the Court:
This emphasis on the employees' perspective furthers the Act's policy of in-
dustrial peace. If the employees find themselves in essentially the same jobs
after the employer transition and if their legitimate expectations in continued
representation by their union are thwarted, their dissatisfaction may lead to
labor unrest.3 7
Nevertheless, Fall River Dyeing protects only the employees' interest
in union representation itself. Important as that is, none of the four
major decisions of the Court3 8 impose significant contractual obliga-
tions upon the new employer. And even where the union has negoti-
ated a successorship clause, it may encounter substantial difficulties.3 9
although noting that "[e]mployees, and the union which represents them, ordina-
rily do not take part in negotiations leading to a change in corporate ownership,"
held that a corporate employer is bound to arbitrate with a union under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the union and another corporation which has
merged with the employer. In two subsequent cases, however, the Court re-
treated from its position in Wiley. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S.
272, 285-86 (1972) (in reversing lower court's decision that successor employer was
bound by substantive terms of bargaining agreement between predecessor em-
ployer and the union, the Court distinguished Wiley by noting that (1) Wiley
involved a section 301 suit to invoke an arbitration clause, not an unfair labor
practice, and (2) Wiley was decided in the context of state law requiring the sur-
viving corporation to assume obligations of the disappearing company in a
merger); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel Em-
ployees Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (holding that employer who purchases
substantially all of the assets of another employer is not bound by the substantive
terms of the employer's bargaining agreement with the union).
36. 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987).
37. Id. at 2236.
38. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987); Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel Employees Int'l
Union, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272 (1972);
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
39. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel Employees
Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 258 n.3 (1974) (dicta concerning remedy of injunction
against sale of employer corporation on ground that sale was a breach of bargain-
ing agreement's successorship provision). See also Local Lodge No. 1266, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276,277 n.1 (7th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that injunctive relief prohibiting proposed sale of assets by employer was
available to union when collective bargaining agreements contained a successor-
ship clause); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union 2707 v. West-
ern Air Lines, 813 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated as moot, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987),
(applying reasoning of Panoramic to Railway Labor Act); Local 434 v. Sky Vue
Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1985); Lever Bros. v. International Chem.
Workers Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976); UAW v. Goodyear Aerospace
Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Ohio 1986); General Drivers & Dairy Employees v.
[Vol. 67:28
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Thus, protection is frequently not afforded by either a collective
bargaining agreement or by federal labor law. This has prompted in-
creased discussion about plant closure legislation which would provide
'for notice and other forms of intervention. It may be that such focus is
misallocated energy given the relative importance of ongoing disclo-
sure obligations prior to a crisis type plant closing situation. Such dis-
closure requirements are similar to those imposed throughout much of
Europe and accepted voluntarily by both sides of the bargaining table
in Japan. The relatively weak provisions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act which require an employer to "open its books" only when it
pleads an inability to pay,40 highlight the inadequacy of American la-
bor law in this regard. But in any event, the debate is now about noti-
fication imposed through law.
Numerous objections have been put forward against the idea of
plant closure notification legislation. The one heard most frequently
is that it is in some way responsible for the lack of job creation and
relatively (compared to America)41 high rate of unemployment in Eu-
rope. The difficulty with this assertion is that there is no proof to sup-
port it.42 Moreover, President Reagan's own Task Force has
repudiated the idea in a report issued two years ago.43
A second concern is that workers will sabotage products or lower
productivity if they know that they are likely to lose their jobs. But a
Conference Board study shows that quality and productivity actually
increase subsequent to notification:
The productivity and quality improvements that occur appear to reflect the
reaction of employees to the evidence that management is concerned about
their welfare, the operation of counseling and job search programs that begin
prior to layoff, the resolution of anxieties and uncertainties, and the desire of
workers concerned about reemployment to demonstrate to new employers
that the quality of the work force in the closed plant was high.44
A report issued by the National Academy of Sciences, National
Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine, takes the posi-
Bake Rite Baking Co., 580 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Wis. 1984); Local 381, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rsIv. Tosco, 823 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1987).
40. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Compare Blanc-Jouvan, Worker
Involvement in Management Decisions in France, 58 TuL. L. REv. 1332 (1984)
(outlining French system of worker participation and comparing it with worker
participation in the United States and other western European countries) and
Gould, Union Involvement in Employer Decision Making: Some Reflections on
America and Europe, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1322 (1984) (contrasting union participation
in the United States and Europe).
41. Hershey, Rate of Jobless at Lowest Point in Last 14 Years, N.Y. Times, July 9,
1988, at 1, col. 6.
42. Flanagan, Barriers to Economic Growth: A Transatlantic View 175-229 (Law-
rence & Schultze eds,, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1987).
43. Report of the Subcommittee on the Foreign Experience of the Secretary of La-
bor's Task Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation (1986).
44. Cyert & Mowery, supra note 20, at 157.
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tion that the "best time to undertake programs of job search assist-
ance, counseling, and retraining for workers is prior to their
displacement. In most cases, this can only occur with the cooperation
of the employer - cooperation that includes advance notice to work-
ers of impending plant shutdowns or large permanent layoffs."45
III. THE THEORY OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE: THE
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Essentially three theories have been developed to challenge em-
ployer dismissals of employees who, until approximately a decade ago,
were regarded as terminable at will (i.e. that absent an explicit com-
mitment by the employer to the contrary, they could be dismissed at
any time, for any reason, unless a collective bargaining agreement 46 or
civil service regulation covered the employee in question). However,
in the 1980's there has been a sustained assault upon the terminable at
will principle which has resulted in a number of exceptions to the doc-
trine. The reasons for the upswing in the number of lawsuits filed and
the new found acceptance of employment theories by the courts are
complex.47 But a majority of jurisdictions now accept one or a number
of the theories employed by plaintiffs.48
45. Id. at 155.
46. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKouPi, How ARBITRATION WoRKs, 621-24 (1973) (when
collective bargaining agreements provide for a "just cause" standard for arbitrat-
ing discharge and discipline disputes, the burden of proof is on the employer).
47. Among the reasons given for the increased protection of at-will employees are
the decline of labor unions, displaced mid-level managers resulting from corpo-
rate mergers, increased public awareness of fairness and due process in the work
place, the rise of reverse discrimination litigation, and the use of labor legislation
in the United States. See Gould, supra note 9, at 895-99; A Case for Arbitration,
supra note 14, at 409-10. Criticism of the employment-at-will doctrine in schol-
arly legal literature preceded these changes. See Summers, Individual Protec-
tion Against Unjust Dismissak Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976);
Williams, Job Security and Unfair Dismissal, 38 MOD. L. REV. 292 (1975); Eng-
land, Recent Developments in Wrongful Dismissal Laws and Some Pointers for
Reform, 16 ALBERTA L. REV. 470 (1979); Peck, Some Kind of Hearing for Persons
Discharged from Private Employment, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 313 (1979); Peck,
Unjust Discharges From Employment. A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO
ST. L. J. 1 (1979); Comment, Protecting the Private SectorAt-Will Employee Who
"Blows the Whistle:" A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Pol-
icy, 1977 WIS. L. REv. 777; Note, Contracts - Employee's Discharge Motivated By
Bad Faith, Malice, or Retaliation Constitutes a Breach of an Employment Con-
tract Terminable At-Will, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 300 (1974); Note, Implied Con-
tract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974); Note, Protecting the At
Will Employee Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816 (1980).
48. For an exhaustive list of states providing some exception to the terminable-at-
will doctrine, see Gould, supra note 9, at 887-89 n.6.
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Led by the Supreme Courts of California,49 Connecticut,50 Ore-
gon,5 ' and New Jersey,52 a variety of public policy theories have lim-
ited employer discretion when the reason for the dismissal was
deemed to be inconsistent with public policy. The leading California
decision involved an employee's allegation that he was dismissed be-
cause he refused to violate the state anti-trust law prohibiting a con-
spiracy to engage in price fixing. But some courts, including the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia5 3 and the Supreme Court of
Arizona5 4 have fashioned far more expansive public policy theories.
The practical significance of the public policy cases is that they are
rooted in tort. This means that punitive as well as compensatory dam-
ages for emotional harm and mental pain and suffering are available.
A second line of cases is based upon contract. Many of these cases
impose a contractual obligation upon an employer because of repre-
sentations made to employees about either procedural fairness or a
substantive "just cause" standard for dismissal in the personnel hand-
book or other company materials made available to employees. The
leader in this area was the Supreme Court of Michigan.55 The New
York Court of Appeals, while rejecting the public policy concept,56 ac-
cepted the personnel manual as a basis for contract,5 7 an idea followed
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey8 and others.5 9 Meanwhile, a
California lower court, while vague about the precise standard to be
imposed upon the employer, accepted the view that an implied con-
tract could be created in the employer-employee relationship when
the course of conduct in the form of commendation, promotions, and
so on could serve as a basis for such an implied contract.6 0
The third avenue for employee action is the tort of good faith and
49. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
50. Sheet's v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
51. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
52. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
53. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
54. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
55. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
56. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
57. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1982).
58. Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
59. See Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 196; Comment, Limiting the Employment-At-Will Rule: Enforcing Policy
Manual Promises Through Unilateral Contract Analysis, 16 SETON HALL L. REV.
465 (1986); Note, The Employment Handbook as a Contractual Limitation on the
Employment At Will Doctrine, 31 Vni. L. REv. 335 (1986). Baskin, The Value of
Employee Handbook Disclaimers in Defending Post-Employment Litigation, 38
LAB. L.J. 591 (1987).
60. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
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fair dealing. This theory, predicated upon both contract and tort,6 1
also has been a basis for both punitive and compensatory damages.
These three lines of attack through the courts undoubtedly repre-
sent a more civilized regulation of the employment relationship than
the terminable at will principle. Yet the cases have posed problems
for employers, employees, and the public.
One of the major difficulties is that the availability of substantial
punitive and compensatory awards before juries which are frequently
hostile to employers with public visibility has meant excessive, arbi-
trary, and unpredictable judgments.62 From the employee's perspec-
tive, the cases have been almost equally troubling. The actions heard
before juries are often financial trials by combat in which, even for
those employees who retain lawyers under contingency fee arrange-
ments, the cost of proceeding is considerable. 63 Moreover, most of the
theories - particularly the public policy and contract theories, to the
extent that they require longevity of service on the part of the em-
ployee - are simply not available to the average worker who is able to
take his case to a private system of arbitration when covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement. And, in any event, employers have be-
gun to counterattack by requiring applicants and employees to waive
their right to challenge a dismissal utilizing the "just cause" theory at
the time of hire or prior to the actual dispute64 and have become more
sophisticated in responding to the actions65 - a phenomenon wit-
nessed in the 1970's in connection with fair employment practices liti-
gation. The public, of course, assumes the financial burden for these
cases as they have raged through the state court systems like wildfire.
Twelve years ago, Professor Clyde Summers advocated compre-
hensive unfair dismissal legislation66 such as that now utilized for the
61. See Note, Defining Public Policy in At Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REv. 153,
158-61 (1981); Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d
282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1985), review granted, 712 P.2d 891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740
(1986); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980).
62. Careful analysis and evaluation of potential employer exposure and liability is
contained in Jung & Harkness, The Facts of Wrongful Discharge, DAILY JoUR-
NAL REPORT (Nov. 20, 1987).
63. See California State Bar Ad Hoc Committee on Termination At Will and Wrong-
ful Discharge, To Strike a New Balance: A Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Termination At Will and Wrongful Discharge, Labor & Employment L. News 6-
7 (special edition) (Feb. 8, 1984) [hereinafter Report].
64. See A Case for Arbitration, supra note 14, at 419-20. However, Jung & Harkness,
supra note 62, stress the point that personnel manuals and booklets are not a
major liability concern to employers.
65. Delvecchio, Big Awards Going to Fired Workers, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb.
23, 1988, at A17, col. 5.
66. Summers, supra note 47. For some of the early discussion of the job as property
in this country, see F. MEYERS, OWNERSHIP OF JOBS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY,
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past ten years in Canada.67 Although Montana has recently enacted a
statute of limited scope and protection for employees, 68 and other ju-
risdictions have enacted so called whistleblower statutes,69 no state
has a comprehensive statute in this area. A New York City Bar Com-
mittee advocated a limited statute7 O and the California Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Wrongful Discharge and Termination at Will proposed a
more comprehensive statute7 ' but a combination of factors has thus
far impeded development of legislation,7 2 notwithstanding the AFL-
CIO Executive Council's strong support for such a bill.7s
Meanwhile, although the law of wrongful discharge and, most im-
portant, the juries have expanded the idea of a property right in jobs,
the same is not true of litigation attacking plant closings. A factor in
the unanimity of judicial rejection of employee claims in such circum-
stances was the availability of collective bargaining agreements in the
cases litigated and the failure of unions to negotiate the protection
which the plaintiffs sought from the courts.74 Thus, both the limited
(1964); Green, The Case for the Sit-Down Strike, 90 THE NEW REPUBLIC 199
(1937).
67. 1978 Act to Amend the Canada Labor Code, 26-27 Can. Stat. Ch. 27, § 61.7 (1978).
68. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1987).
69. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.5 (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 31-51m
(West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-840 (Supp. 1987); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.362 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinne,
Supp. 1988).
70. Committee on Labor and Employment Law, At-Will Employment and the Prob-
lem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 170 (1981).
71. Report, supra note 63, at 20-27.
72. See A Case for Arbitration, supra note 14, at 420-23.
73. AFL-CIO Executive Council, Statement on the Empoyment-At-Will Doctrine, 3
(Bal Harbour, Fla., Feb. 20,1987) (on file with author). Labor unions may realize
the following benefits from a wrongful discharge statute: Union representation
of non-union employees at a dismissal hearing would effectively demonstrate to
non-union employees the benefits of union representation; unions can use the
dispute resolution machinery of a wrongful discharge statute in organizational
drives; once non-union employees experience how beneficial a wrongful dismissal
statute can be, they may desire union representation to bargain for a system more
tailored to their needs; unions may also desire wrongful dismissal legislation to
ensure that arbitration is binding and final in those jurisdictions which currently
permit union employees, under certain circumstances, to by-pass the collectively
bargained arbitration procedure and proceed to resolve their dismissal in state
court. See A Case for Arbitration, supra note 14, at 417-19 and supra note 12.
74. See Local 1330, United Steelworkers v. United States Steel, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir.
1980); Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969); Hass v. Darigold Dairy Prods. Co., 751 F.2d 1096
(9th Cir. 1985); Cooper v. General Motors Corp., 651 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1981);
Baker v. Newspapers & Graphics Communication Union, Local 6, 628 F.2d 156
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Ekas v. Carling Nat'l Breweries, Inc., 602 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Local 1251, UAW v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,
405 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1968); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), affrd,
370 U.S. 530 (1962); Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962). Compare Singer, The Reliance Interest in Prop-
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scope and content of collective bargaining and the unwillingness of the
courts to impose limitations upon employer property interests outside
the collective agreement have shifted the focus of activity to Congress
and the state legislatures. Slowly and hesitantly the legislative
branches of government have begun to respond to the mass or collec-
tive dismissal problem of which plant closings are the most dramatic
and horrific manifestation.
IV. STATE PLANT CLOSURE LEGISLATION
Nine states have laws regulating plant closings or relocations: Con-
necticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. An examination of some of these
statutes reveals a broad spectrum of legislative responses to the
problems caused by plant closings and relocations.75
A. Summary of State Legislation
Maine. Enacted in 1980, the Maine legislation regulates both plant
relocations and terminations. In a plant employing one hundred or
more persons, if there is a removal of operations one hundred or more
miles from its original location, an employer is required to pay a
worker one week's severance pay for each year of employment in that
establishment. An employer is not liable for severance pay when the
relocation or termination of a covered establishment is "necessitated
by physical calamity," when the employee is covered by an "express
contract" providing for severance pay, when the employee accepts em-
ployment at the new location, or when the employee has been em-
ployed less than three years. There is an obligation to notify the state
sixty days prior to a relocation and to give comparable notice to both
employees and the municipality, if the business is relocating outside
the state.76
Maryland. Maryland enacted legislation in 1985 covering employ-
ers with at least fifty employees. The statute covers so called "reduc-
tions in operations" which include the "relocation of part of an
employer's operation from one workplace to another existing or pro-
posed site" and the "shutting down" of a workplace or portion of a
erty, 40 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1988) with F. O'CONNELL, PLANT CIOSINGS: WORKER
RIGHTS, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1986).
75. See Fine & Wall, Plant Closing Laws: More Harmful Than Helpful?, Legal
Times, Oct. 28, 1985, at 11, col. 3; Folbre, Leighton & Roderick, Plant Closings and
Their Regulation in Maine, 1972-1982, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 185 (1984);
Harrison, Plant Closures: Efforts to Cushion the Blow, June MONTHLY LAB. REV.
41 (1984); Report on Mass Layoffs and Plant Closings in 1986, BUREAU OF LAB.
STATISTICS (1987). See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 21-2946 (1987 Supp.); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1 (BNA SLL 4a).
76. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (Supp. 1987).
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workplace that reduces the number of employees by at least 25% or
fifteen employees, whichever is greater, over a three month period.
The Maryland Secretary of Employment and Training is to develop
guidelines governing to the appropriate time for advance notification
and "whenever possible and appropriate" at least ninety days notice
shall be given. Guidelines are to be established to address the appro-
priate continuation of benefits such as health insurance, severance
pay, and pension plans that an employer should provide for employees
who will be terminated due to a "reduction in operations" or a "spe-
cific mechanism" that the employer can utilize by seeking assistance
from the state quick response program.7 7
Connecticut. Connecticut enacted legislation in 1983 covering em-
ployers who have employed 100 or more persons within a twelve
month period preceding a plant closing. The statute regulates both
relocations and closings and provides that the existing group health
insurance is to be paid for a period of 120 days or until such time as the
employee becomes eligible for other group coverage. The statute does
not cover employees who choose to be employed at the relocated facil-
ity. Any contractual provision which has been "arrived at through a
collective bargaining process that contains provisions requiring the
employer to pay for the continuation of existing group health insur-
ance" in a relocation or plant closing context supersedes the require-
ments of the statute.7 8
Massachusetts. Enacted in 1985, the Massachusetts legislation, like
that of Maryland, provides for voluntary notification and requires the
employer to "promptly report a plant closing to the state and it shall
determine whether the closing will affect ninety percent of the em-
ployees through permanent separation within a six month period
prior to the plant closing." The Massachusetts law also established a
re-employment assistance program to provide counseling, placement,
training, and any other services deemed necessary to employees termi-
nated in plant closings which will lead to re-employment.79
Michigan. Michigan enacted legislation in 1985 which addresses
both relocation and plant closings. The Michigan Department of La-
bor is instructed to establish a program to assist in development of
employee owned corporations which "may operate when an establish-
ment is closing or transferring operations resulting in a loss of jobs
and when a request for assistance is made by an affected individual or
group of individuals." The Department is instructed to encourage em-
ployers considering a "decision to effect a closing or relocation of oper-
ations" to give notice of the decision "as early as possible" to both the
Department, employees, and any labor organization which represents
77. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41A §§ 3-301 to 3-304 (Supp. 1987).
78. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51n to 31-51o (West 1987 & Supp. 1988).




South Carolina. The South Carolina statute imposes an obligation
upon the employer to provide notice in the event that the employee is
required to give notice that he will quit. Such employers:
shall give notice to its employees of its purpose to quit work or shutdown by
posting in each room of its building not less than two weeks in advance or the
same length of time in advance as is required by it of its employees before they
may quit work, a printed notice of such purpose, stating the date of the begin-
ning of the shutdown or cessation from work and the approximate length of
time the continuous shutdown is to continue.
These obligations are inapplicable where shutdown is caused by an un-
foreseen accident to machinery, or by "some act of God or the public
enemy." An employer that fails to post the notice subjects itself to a
fine not to exceed $5,000, and is liable to each of its employees for
"such damages" as they may suffer by reason of failure to give the
notice.8 '
Wisconsin. Wisconsin enacted legislation in 1976 which requires
any employer who employs 100 or more persons and who has plans for
merger, liquidation, disposition, or relocation in or out of the state (re-
sulting in a cessation of business operations affecting ten or more em-
ployees) to notify the State, any affected employee, any collective
bargaining representative of any employee, and the clerk of any town,
village, city, or county in which the affected place of employment is
located. The notice must be in writing and given no later than sixty
days prior to the date of the above described actions. Any employer
that violates this provision is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be
fined not more than fifty dollars for each employee who loses a job as
result of the employer's termination of operations.8 2
B. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of plant closure legislation at the state and
local level has been an issue that has grown with the passage of new
laws. The issue arises by virtue of both the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)83 and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The argument relating to ERISA is that state legislation
which provides benefits for dislocated workers is an employee benefit
plan within the meaning of ERISA and, therefore, is preempted by
virtue of the supremacy clause.
The second issue relates to the National Labor Relations Act,
which has long been an object of considerable preemption litigation8 4
80. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.731-.738 (West Supp. 1987).
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
82. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp. 1986).
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
84. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986); Wisconsin
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The argument relating to the NLRA springs from the view that the
subject matter addressed by plant closure legislation is regulated by
the Act and, therefore, state regulation of the same subject matter is
prohibited. Supreme Court decisions such as First National Mainte-
nance v. NLRB,85 dealing with the obligation of an employer to bar-
gain about a decision to close or partially close its operations as a
mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of the Act, indi-
cate that plant closure legislation may also be a mandatory bargaining
subject within the meaning of the Act.
In 1987 the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to consider this
issue in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. CoyneS and rejected preemption
arguments regarding both statutes. In Fort Halifax, the Court was
confronted with a Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-
time severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing.
The statute was found to apply equally to union and non-union em-
ployees and enterprises.
The Court also held that the Maine statute did not establish or re-
quire employer maintenance of employee benefit plans within the
meaning of ERISA. Said Justice Brennan writing for the majority:
The purposes of ERISA's pre-emption provision make clear that the Maine
statute in no way raises the types of concerns that prompted pre-emption.
Congress intended pre-emption to afford employers the advantages of a uni-
form set of administrative procedures governed by a single set of regulations.
This concern only arises, however, with respect to benefits whose provision by
nature requires an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer's
obligation. It is for this reason that Congress pre-empted state laws relating to
plans, rather than to simply benefits. Only a plan embodies a set of adminis-
trative practices vulnerable to the burden that would be imposed by a patch-
work scheme of regulation.
8 7
The Court unanimouslySS rejected the view that the National La-
bor Relations Act's regulation of mandatory subjects of bargaining
preempted social legislation. The Court analogized other decisions in
which it had held that the establishment of minimum substantive la-
bor standards was not inconsistent with the promotion of the collec-
tive bargaining process itself. Said the Court:
[Tihe NLRA is concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining process, not
with the substantive terms that may emerge from such bargaining .... It is
true that the Maine statute gives employees something for which they other-
wise might have to bargain. That is true, however, with regard to any state
law that substantively regulates employment conditions. Both employers and
Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986);
Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, Local 54, 468 U.S. 491
(1984).
85. 425 U.S. 666 (1981).
86. 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987).
87. Id. at 2217.




employees come to the bargaining table with rights under state law that form
a 'backdrop' for their negotiations.8 9
A related issue that frequently arises by virtue of state plant clo-
sure legislation is the compatibility of notification or disclosure obliga-
tions with the NLRA's obligation to bargain. It might be contended
that the obligation to notify more precisely resembles the form of the
collective bargaining process itself rather than substantive terms in-
volving the Maine severance statute presented in Fort Halifax - and
the argument could be made even more effectively with regard to
state law which provides for periodic or some other form of disclosure.
Notification is a more troublesome issue, given the holding of First
National Maintenance. The effects which flow from the decision may
be just as effective a regulation as statutory enactments. On the other
hand, the fact that state legislation generally applies both in and out of
the collective bargaining process and does not provide for exclusive
focus upon the union role in notification where unions exist, may ar-
gue for the proposition that the state is providing protection for all
employees in periods of economic distress - a concern which has only
an indirect impact upon the collective bargaining process itself.
But the Court's holding in NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.,90
addressing the circumstances under which a failure to disclose can be
equated with an unlawful refusal to bargain, presents a question even
farther over on the continuum leading to preemption than the issues
involved with notification. Both state regulation and federal labor law
relating to disclosure would be designed to allow for unions and em-
ployees to bargain, negotiate, or plan more intelligently than would
otherwise be the case. And yet, when one looks at the House of Rep-
resentatives Committee on Education and Labor Report on Plant Clo-
sure Legislation in 1985, it seems difficult to distinguish between
federal and state regulations that impose a duty to consult as well.
Said the committee:
The 'duty to consult' will give employees, through their unions, an opportu-
nity to develop alternatives to a closure or cutback and a forum for bringing
those alternatives before the employer. The employers will be obligated to
provide information the union requests that would help in understanding the
reasons for the employer's decision and in developing alternatives. The em-
ployer will be obligated to consult with the union in a good faith effort to find
a way to avoid or modify the proposed closure or cutback.9 1
But the preemption issue on notice and the consultation inherent
89. Id. at 2222 (citations omitted).
90. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
91. H.R. REP. No. 336, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985). The 1987 version of legislation
proposals was quite moderate, as is the 1988 statute. See, Changes in the Plant
Closings Provisions of the Trade Bill to address concerns raised by Senators and
the business community, July 6, 1987 (on file with the author).
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in it, seem to have been resolved by new federal legislation discussed
below.
V. FEDERAL PLANT CLOSURE LEGISLATION
On August 4, 1988, The Worker Adjustment Retraining Notifica-
tion Act or the Plant Closing Notification Act of 1988 became effec-
tive, although its major feature will not become operative until six
months after the Act becomes law. President Reagan, expressing con-
tinued opposition to its principles, allowed it to become law without
his signature.92 The Act obliges employers who employ more than 100
employees to provide sixty days notice before a plant closing or mass
layoff to representatives of the employees or, in the event that there is
no representative, to "each affected employee" and to state and local
government representatives. A plant closing is a shutdown which re-
sults in an employment loss at the single site of employment during
any thirty day period for fifty or more employees, and a mass layoff
notice obligation is triggered by loss of employment for at least 33% of
the employees and at least fifty employees - or, in the alternative, 500
employees.
The statute is strewn with numerous limitations,93 the first of
which is the above mentioned 100 employee statutory coverage which
means that approximately half of the work force is unprotected. Part
time employees are excluded and are defined as employees who work
less than twenty hours per week, or who have been employed for
fewer than six of the twelve months preceding the date on which no-
tice is required. Temporary employees hired with the "understand-
ing" that their employment would be limited to a specific duration are
not covered. Moreover, sixty days is an extraordinarily abbreviated
period of time for notice and comes far too late to encourage work
92. Roberts, President Decides Not to Veto Bill Requiring Notice of Plant Closings,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1988, at Al, col. 2; Thomas, Reagan to Allow Plant Closing
Bill to Become Law, San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 2, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
93. In one respect, the 1988 Act may expand union and employee rights under the
NLRA. Section 8(b) states that an employee of the seller at the time of the exe-
cution of the sale agreement becomes an employee of the purchaser "immediately
after the effective date of the sale." Heretofore, federal labor law did not oblige
the purchaser to hire the seller's employees under any circumstance. This
change would then oblige purchasing employers to recognize unions since the re-
hiring of the seller's employees is a key factor where there was a pre-existing
bargaining relationship. The 1988 Act mitigates the effects of decisions like How-
ard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel Employees Int'l
Union, 417 U.S. 249 (1974) and NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
Accordingly, the purchaser avoids such obligations only where (1) the seller pro-
vides proper 60 day notice, or (2) the seller offers transfers with no more than a 6
month hiatus, or break, in the employee's employment. For conflicting views in
this area, see N.Y. Times, May 31, 1988, at E30, col. 3.
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innovation, employee concessions, or other methods that the periodic
sharing of sales and profit information, for instance, might promote.
Another limitation consisting of the reduction of the notification
period and substitution of notice which is "practicable" is provided for
where (1) the employer had to shut down before the sixty day period
and was "actively" seeking capital or business which would have ena-
bled the employer to avoid or postpone the shutdown and had a good
faith belief that the notice would have precluded the needed capital or
business; (2) where a premature closing, i.e. before sixty days, was
caused by business circumstances that were "not reasonably foresee-
able" at the time that notice would have been required; (3) where the
failure to give notice was attributable to a "natural disaster, such as a
flood, earthquake, or the drought currently ravaging the farmlands of
the United States;" or (4) the closing or layoff "constitutes" a strike or
a lockout "not intended to evade the requirements of the Act." Notice
is not required where an employer permanently replaces an economic
striker, although the Act is careful to state that decisions such as
NLRB v. MacKays4 which have established the proposition that an
employer can permanently replace strikers with strikebreakers are
not affected. And in sharp contrast to European practice and some of
the state laws in the United States, the Act does not provide for sever-
ance pay or other forms of compensation beyond unemployment com-
pensation and welfare which might be available - merely notice to
the private parties and public bodies defined by the statute.
The Act provides for civil actions against employers that violate
the notice provisions and back pay for each day of violation at a rate of
compensation not higher than the average regular rate received by the
employee during the last three years of the employee's employment,
or the final regular rate received by such employee. A civil penalty of
not more than $500 for each day of violation is provided in connection
with failure to notify a unit of local government. No injunction is
available. A good faith or reasonable grounds for believing that the
"act or omission" was not a violation of the act is provided - although
it is difficult to see where this would apply given the numerous excep-
tions referred to above. The statute is intended to provide rights and
remedies in addition to and not in lieu of other contractual or statu-
tory rights and remedies established either by collective bargaining
agreements or state legislation.
94. 304 U.S. 333 (1930). Section 4 of the 1988 Act specifically disavows any intent to
validate or invalidate any judicial or administrative decision on the permanent
strike replacement issue. It would seem that the 1988 Act makes MacKay more
vulnerable to reexamination and challenge. See generally Gould, Vital Issues
and New Directions in Labor-Management Relations: "The Permanent Replace-
ment of Strikers," Speech for United States Dept. of Labor Conference (Mar. 17,
1988) (on file with author).
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Quite obviously, the statute is limited and the exceptions to the
notice obligation are quite numerous. Nevertheless, it is symbolic in a
positive as well as a negative sense.95 It is quite possible that amend-
ments will be enacted now that the precedent for such a statute has
been established. This is why President Reagan opposed the law, de-
spite its limitations, with such vigor. The refusal to sign the law
rather than to veto it was simply a bow to the inevitable political
reality.96
VI. OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW
In 1963, the International Labor Organization (ILO) first took initi-
ative on the job termination issue through the issuance of a Recom-
mendation, which the member states did not ratify. Only in 1982,
subsequent to European labor law described in more detail below, did
the ILO issue a Convention. The 1982 Convention, which has not been
ratified by the United States97, provides for the right of employees'
representatives to consult with employers about procedures to mini-
mize dismissals and to mitigate adverse effects "as early as possible."98
It also permits terminations that have been made for "valid reasons"
and provides that employees receive a "reasonable period of notice or
compensation in lieu thereof" as well as separation pay.
The employer must provide workers' representatives with infor-
mation concerning the reasons for dismissals in "good time" and the
employer is required to notify governmental authorities. While most
American states have accepted one of the contract or tort theories to
limit an employer's right to dismiss employees in the non-union sec-
tor, and employers who have negotiated collective bargaining agree-
ments have generally promised not to dismiss employees except for
"just cause," it cannot be said that non-union employees in this coun-
try have the explicit right to be substantively protected against dismis-
sal when it is done for an invalid reason. Those employees in states
which do not have plant closure legislation do not have the right to
consult with employers through employee representatives or to re-
ceive notice and severance pay. Indeed, even a majority of those em-
ployees covered by collective bargaining agreements will not have
such rights as a matter of contract. The limited scope of state law and
95. See Gould, Plant Closing Law May Herald Better Reforms, San Jose Mercury
News, Aug. 4, 1988, at B7, col. 3.
96. Hume, Succumbing to Politics, Reagan Decides Against Vetoing Plant Closing
Measure, Wall St. J., Aug. 3,1988, at 3, col. 5; Roberts, Reagan is Pressed on Plant
Closings, N.Y. Times, Jul. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
97. However, the Convention has been ratified by nine countries: Cameroon, Cyprus,
Malawi, Niger, Spain, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.
98. See International Labour Office, Official Bull., Vol. 65, Ser. A. at 72 (1982).
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the fact that adequate notice is infrequently provided to employees are
reasons that Congressional action is an urgent priority.
In addition to the ILO 1982 Convention, the European Economic
Community has been considering the so called Vredeling proposal.
The Vredeling proposal requires multi-national corporations, includ-
ing European subsidiaries of American corporations doing business
with the European Economic Community, to consult with employees'
representatives before adopting policies which might affect employ-
ment conditions. Moreover, Vredeling, along with OECD guidelines, 99
requires multi-national corporations to provide employees annually
with information regarding both the corporation's current financial
situation and its future plans and prospects. One can easily see that
even for those employees who are represented by unions and subject
to the National Labor Relations Act the ambit of Truitt is much more
limited in scope. Federal and state legislation, as well as congressional
bills which have been seriously considered, do not seem to venture
into this realm.
VII. RELEVANT WESTERN EUROPEAN LAW AND
EXPERIENCE: THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD FOR
DISMISSAL
Western European legislation antedates the 1982 ILO Convention
and provides for some form of substantive limitation upon an em-
ployer's right to dismiss an employee both in and out of the plant clos-
ing or collective dismissal context. Litigation arising under such
legislation is heard by tripartite courts or tribunals - consisting of
labor, management, and public representatives - in Britain, France,
Sweden, and Germany. Courts of general jurisdiction hear such dis-
putes in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands. All of the specialized
tribunals promote the peaceable mediation of dismissals prior to the
necessity for formal procedures.
In Britain and Sweden "unfair" dismissals or those which cannot
be justified on "objective" grounds are prohibited. In France, those
dismissals which are not "just and reasonable" are outlawed. In Ger-
many dismissals may only be instituted where they are "socially war-
ranted." In Japan, where there is no unfair dismissal legislation as
such, the Civil Code prohibits both disciplinary and economic dismis-
sals which constitute an "abuse" of power. Moreover, in Japan, by vir-
tue of informal understandings not generally reflected in collective
bargaining agreements themselves, what is frequently referred to as
99. Blanpain, Transnational Regulation of the Labor Relations of Multinational En-
terprises, 58 CHI.-JKENT L. REV. 909, 940 (1982). For text of the Vredeling Propo-
sal, see Monty, DOCUMENTATION IN THE VREDELING PROPOSAL 57-219 (1983); See
generally Yemin, Comparative Survey in Workforce Reduction in Undertaking
(International Labor Office, 1982).
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"lifetime" employment or permanent employment is not given to
some employees in major companies until they are in their late
fifties.100
All of this contrasts with the much more limited protection avail-
able in the United States. As noted above, the state courts have fash-
ioned a common law of contract and tort which limits the employers'
ability to dismiss employees in both an individual disciplinary and col-
lective economic context. Collective bargaining agreements some-
times provide limitations in the organized sector although the
National Labor Relations Act, as interpreted by the Court, has not
been generally helpful.
Three major problems have emerged in Europe which have some
relevance to the American situation. The first relates to remedies.
French law provides for reinstatement in limited circumstances -
e.g., when a union representative is dismissed. Swedish law, on the
other hand, disavows reinstatement and provides for only compensa-
tion. Sweden requires that a worker remain on the job while his dis-
missal claim is pending before the Labor Court and thus places the
burden on the employer while the matter is being contested - a pro-
cedure remarkably similar to the one negotiated recently by the
United Steelworkers.
In Britain and Germany, reinstatement is available, but its use is
extraordinarily infrequent. Indeed, some writers have taken a partic-
ularly downcast view of the state of German labor law in relation to
remedies:
In four out of five successfully completed proceedings, the parties agreed
within a judicial or extra judicial settlement on continuation of the employ-
ment relationship. The same goal was achieved in only a fifth of the success-
ful cases, ie. in 1.7 per cent of all lawsuits, by court decision. If the number of
the actually continued employment relationships is viewed in relation to the
whole number of dismissals at the initiative of the employer in 1978, the rate
of efficiency deteriorates drastically to only 0.7 per cent. That is, of every
10,000 dismissed employees, seventy-one are continued in employment after
having invoked the Law of Protection from Dismissal. For the overwhelming
majority of dismissed employees this law does not seem to play any practical
part. 1 0 1
In Britain, this appears to be the case because compensation, which
is available to an employee in lieu of reinstatement even when the
latter is ordered, is too low.' 02 The inadequacy of compensation is a
complaint which is heard throughout Western Europe.
A very different situation prevails in America. While substantial
100. See generally W. GOULD, JAPAN's RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAw (1984).
101. Dose - Digenopouos & Holand, Dismissal of Employees in the Federal Republic
of Germany, 48 MOD. L. REV. 539, 559 (1985) (citation omitted).
102. See L. DIcKENs, M. JoNES, B. WEEKEs & M. HART, DIsMISSED: A STUDY OF UN-
FAIR DIMsmssAL AND THE INDusTRAL TRIBuNAL SYsTEM 107-39 (1985). See also
Industrial Tribunals, A Report by Justice (1987).
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punitive and compensatory damages are available in American wrong-
ful discharge actions, the fact is that reinstatement is generally not
part of the court's remedy because of the hostility of common law to-
ward an equitable order that would compel personal services and
would require involvement in a personal relationship. One of the ma-
jor reasons for advocacy of wrongful discharge legislation and arbitra-
tion as a forum in the United States is that arbitrators, like the
National Labor Relations Board,103 frequently provide for reinstate-
ment as a remedy.
Another problem that has developed with unfair labor practice leg-
islation is the demand in all Western European countries to exclude
more small employers from statutory coverage and to make more dif-
ficult employee eligibility tests for access to a tribunal. Germany ex-
cludes coverage to employees who are employed for six months or
less.104 Britain made the employee's eligibility two years.1 05 Sweden
has enacted similar legislation.106 The American case law, insofar as it
is predicated upon implied contracts and the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing seems designed, by its rationale, to exclude employees
who do not possess similar longevity.
A. Union Influence Prior to the Decision
European labor legislation addresses itself to the matter of assur-
ing or promoting union and worker involvement in employer decision
making in a number of ways. In the first instance, although the
Vredeling directive precludes union and works council access to em-
ployer information which is confidential, both Germany and Sweden
have legislated union works council access to such matters. Both
countries have either developed or fostered the growth of institutions
and practices which will allow for effective employee participation
before employer decisions are made.
Sweden has provided that local clubs, or local unions as Americans
would call them, are to be the recipients of such information. Presum-
ably, the theory of the Swedish Joint Regulation Act of 1976 which
provides for such access is that such organizations will be less tempted
to reveal important information to an employer's competitors when
the national union also has members, but the local does not. Ger-
103. See Gould, supra note 9, at 912; Trudeau, Statutory Protection Against Unjust
Dismissal for Unorganized Workers, (Harvard Law School, April 1985) (em-
ployer resistance to arbitral award by frequently seeking judicial review).
104. See Weiss, Individual Employment Rights Focusing on Job Security in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, 67 NEB. L. REV. 82 (1988).
105. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, as Amended 2 Eliz., Chap. 44,
§64A.
106. Act Concerning Security of Employment in Sweden, as amended, (1984) Sections
4 & 5. See R. FAHLBECK, LABOUR LAW IN SWEDEN 39-47 (1981).
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many, like France'0 7, has statutorily created works councils which
must be consulted about dismissals and other management decisions
before they are instituted.
Union and employee involvement in dismissal decisions and plant
closings is also provided through representation on the supervisory
board in Germany and Sweden. This is a less important feature of the
industrial relations law system in Sweden where minority representa-
tion has been established. But it has become a key matter of debate in
Germany where parity between unions or worker representatives and
employer representatives, as provided for in coal and steel, was not
obtained through the 1976 Co-Determination Act,108 although near
parity was provided in most of the rest of the private sector.109
B. Notification and Consultation of Workers and Government
Representatives
In Germany the Works Constitution Act requires employers to in-
form the works council of a dismissal and to take the same initiative
with the Regional Labor Office regarding mass dismissals which might
take place during a twelve month period. The dismissal must be "so-
cially warranted" which often requires the employer to justify the dis-
missal of an individual employee on grounds of social circumstances,
family obligations, seniority, and so on.
But in countries like Britain, for instance, the dismissal which is
economic in origin cannot be challenged under the labor law although
severance and notification are provided. France took an intermediate
position until 1986 by involving its administrative authorities in ex-
ploring the possibility of alternatives to closure. Until 1986 the French
authorities could hold up the dismissal pending approval, a provision
107. See generally Glendon, French Labor Law Reform 1982-1983: The Struggle for
Collective Bargaining, 32 AM. J. ComP. L. 449 (Summer 1984); Plasencia Employ-
ment at Will," The French Experience as a Basisfor Reform, 9 ComP. LAB. L.J. 294
(1988).
108. Act Respecting Workers' Co-Determination (Co-Determination Act),
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1, Pt 1, No. 51, at 1153 (1976).
109. West German workers have a voice in decisions affecting their worklife at four
different levels: the government level where workers' representatives nomi-
nated by the unions sit on various governmental bodies; the enterprise level
where workers' representatives participate in the management of an enterprise
on supervisory boards; industry level where employees' unions negotiate collec-
tive agreements; and the shop level where works councils represent employees in
establishing shop agreements and resolving disputes at the plant level (represent-
atives of works councils, although often submitted for election by unions, act in-
dependently of the unions and consider themselves as representatives of workers
at the shop level). See Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West
Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. CON-




which has been repealed by the Chirac Government which resigned
this past spring.
Britain, through its Employment Protection Act of 1975, has mir-
rored the notice and consultation provisions of German law. But the
British statute contains an escape clause through which the statute's
notification provisions are declared inoperable when there are "special
circumstances which render it not reasonably practicable for the em-
ployer to comply with any of the statutory requirements." 1 0 In such
circumstances the employer need take only those initiatives toward
compliance which are "reasonably practicable" in the "circum-
stances." 111 States Professor Anderman:
The courts have been rather generous in their interpretation of this escape
clause. Although gradual insolvency has not been sufficient, sudden financial
disaster, such as insolvency due to withdrawal of a perspective purchaser, and
a bank calling in a receiver or a failure to procure a government loan have
been held to be special circumstances justifying no consultation by the
employer. 112
One difficulty with the plant closure legislation, like unfair dismis-
sal legislation, is the ineffectiveness of the remedy. There has been no
litigation in Britain about the Employment Protection Act's plant clo-
sure provisions and it appears as though employers that have found
the notice provisions too burdensome and considered the escape clause
unavailable have simply paid the workers in lieu of notice - what the
courts would have ordered them to do in any event. Indeed, in the mid
1970's in Germany, many of the employers in automobile and other
manufacturing provided severance pay benefits in lieu of compliance
with the notice provisions.
The ability to escape the statute's procedures in Britain, Germany,
or France defeats one of the basic purposes of the legislation - the
development of social plans, as the Germans call them, devised to pro-
vide for employment opportunities, training, or assistance in the wake
of the dislocation triggered by a plant closing.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The 1980's have produced a body of common law in most jurisdic-
tions at the state level as well as plant closure legislation in a more
limited number of jurisdictions. America is thus taking its first steps
forward in terrain long since furrowed by Europe. The problems of
effective administration of the legislation, particularly in the remedy
area, have proved considerable in Europe and, notwithstanding our
substantially different tradition in many aspects of labor law, this
110. Anderman, United Kingdom in Restructuring Labour in the Enterprise, 15





country can learn from the strength as well as the limitations of the
European experience. While this country has long accepted reinstate-
ment as a matter of course under the National Labor Relations Act
and arbitration, the European view seems to have persisted in the
wrongful dismissal arena. Unless the labor movement becomes deeply
involved in the administration of unfair dismissal legislation as well as
its development, the absence of a monitor at the work place could
erode the most carefully planned reinstatement procedures.
But the important point is that America is belatedly accepting
some property characteristics in the job outside the unionized and
public sectors. Plant closure legislation, enacted in a minority of the
states, may constitute a part of the 1988 political debate and ultimately
find its way into federal law. Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachu-
setts, the 1988 Democratic nominee for President, supported compre-
hensive plant closure legislation and stated that it would be enacted
during the first ninety days of his administration in 1989 before it be-
came law. Because of the problems bound up with wrongful discharge
litigation, new legislation should be enacted here as well although ac-
tivity at the state level may preclude any federal effort.
America, now hobbled by its alarmingly low rate of unionization, is
catching up in the job security area. The Plant Closing Notification
Act of 1988 will surely impel both Congress and the state legislatures
to review carefully the need for federal and state protection of em-
ployees' jobs.113 The country still has far to go.
113. See Gould, Plant Closing Law May Herald Better Reforms, San Jose Mercury
News, Aug. 4, 1988, at B7, col. 3.
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